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and  Rational  Expectations: 
Implications  of the  Gramlich  Study 
EDWARD GRAMLICH'S  STUDY  in this issue raises a question by a method 
that  has frequently  been found  fruitful  in scientific  efforts.  He presents  an 
interpretation  of observed  data  in terms  of a widely  used analytical  frame- 
work that points to a very unfavorable  distribution  of the consequences 
of demand  disinflation  by undesirable  output effects, on the one hand, 
and  desired  price  effects  on the other.  Yet he directs  attention  to the possi- 
bility that a reconstruction  of the standard  framework  could reduce  the 
weaknesses  he detects  in the interpretation  he presents.  He does not favor 
the specific  reinterpretation  that  I have suggested  in various  writings1  and 
I will describe  below-indeed,  he leans perhaps  more to an attitude  of 
doubt in this regard-but he has an open mind about  the methods  of im- 
proving  the conventional  framework.  Essentially,  he plays  into the hands 
of all those  of us who are  even  more  skeptical  than  he is about  the conven- 
tional way of going about  macroeconomic  modeling  and who believe in 
the superiority  of a specific  alternative.  I would like to make use of the 
opportunity  his work  provides.  This is done partly  with reference  to his 
empirical  findings,  to which  I turn  in the third  section,  after  an attempt  to 
place  the matter  in perspective. 
The Incomplete  Overlap  between  Two Hypotheses 
Conclusions  derived  from analysis  incorporating  what may be termed 
the credibility  effect overlap with conclusions  from analysis  commonly 
1. For instance, in Fellner, Towards  a Reconstruction  of Macroeconomics:  Prob- 
lems of Theory and Policy (American Enterprise  Institute, 1976). 
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associated  with  the hypothesis  of rational  expectations.  Both hypotheses 
lead to a critical  attitude  concerning  essential  features  of the macroeco- 
nomic models most frequently  used, but the two hypotheses  need to be 
distinguished  from  each  other.  In this  paper  I briefly  justify  this statement 
and argue  in favor of the hypothesis  stressing  the credibility  effect. My 
conclusion  is that  once one eliminates  the unconvincing  elements  from  the 
rational  expectations  hypothesis,  one is left with  the credibility  hypothesis 
as it is here interpreted.  The hypotheses  under  consideration  have the fol- 
lowing  main  properties. 
Standard  models-The  frameworks  presently  regarded  as conventional 
explain  the current  wage and price increase  of a period  in large part by 
the preceding  wage  and  price  increase,  though  other  variables  such as the 
"slack,"  usually  measured  by the unemployment  rate, also enter  into the 
explanation.  Expectations  concerning  future  demand-management  policy 
enter  here  merely  implicitly  through  the assumption  that-for  any  chosen 
value  of other  variables  such  as the slack-the  past  money-wage  and  price 
increases  determine  the  current  wage  increases  by unchanging  coefficients. 
At the same  time,  in these  models  the current  money-wage  increases  play 
a very large role in determining  the current  price increases,  also by un- 
changing  coefficients.  Thus there  is no room in the standard  models for 
the hypothesis  that a perceived  change in the likely future conduct of 
demand-management  policies-in  the consistency of those policies- 
would alter  the effect  of past wage and price  increases  on the current  in- 
creases,  or would alter  the current  increases  that  become  associated  with 
any currently  observed  slack.  Both the credibility  hypothesis  and the ra- 
tional expectations  hypothesis are critical of the assumption  that the 
money-wage  and the price trend are insensitive  to the perceived  policy 
posture,  except  insofar  as that  posture  expresses  itself in the currently  ob- 
served  slack given the other variables  specified  in the standard  models. 
The  credibility hypothesis-The  hypothesis  of  the  credibility effect 
maintains  that market  expectations,  and thus the effect of past money- 
wage and price  increases  and of any currently  observed  slack on current 
money-wage  and price increases, are significantly  influenced  by the ex- 
pected  future  behavior  of policymakers.  Emphasis  is placed  on the differ- 
ence between  states of the economy  in which inconsistent  policies lead 
market  participants  to form  diffuse  personal  probability  distributions  with 
risk  allowances  playing  a large  role in their  decisionmaking,  and states  of 
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pectations  and lead to much more strongly  peaked and widely shared 
personal  probability  distributions  concerning  future  events. 
In particular,  the  hypothesis  maintains  that  standard-model  coefficients 
such  as those  estimated  from  Gramlich's  wage-increase  equation  1' would 
change  significantly  for the better-in  the direction  of a much  more  rapid 
reduction  of inflation  for any  given  slack-if  a demand-management  pol- 
icy, which  with  brief  interruptions  was accommodative  during  a large  part 
of his sample  period,  changed  to a credible  policy of consistent  demand 
disinflation.  This change  in policies would have a major  effect on price 
expectations,  and the estimated  coefficients  would turn  out to have over- 
stated  the effect  of the lagged  price  and wage  increases  on the current  in- 
creases.  Allowance  needs  to be made  for a transition  period  during  which 
lags in establishing  credibility,  as well as past contracts  and their  tempo- 
rary  influence  on new contracts,  would continue  to slow the process of 
price  deceleration.  But thereafter  price  deceleration  would speed  up sub- 
stantially,  the public's  objectives  being set in real terms. 
For analogous  reasons  the hypothesis  maintains  that coefficients  such 
as those of Gramlich  understate  the current  increases  in relation  to the 
preceding  wage and price increases  for alternative  levels of the slack if 
the authorities  shift from a firm and credible  anti-inflationary  policy to 
one that accommodates  inflation  with minor  and sporadic  interruptions. 
Considering  that during Gramlich's  sample period (1954-77)  a pro- 
nounced  shift  from  credibility  to laxity  did in fact occur  in this sense,  the 
hypothesis  suggests  that  during  the sample  period  the deviations  observed 
from the values  predicted  by the model should show a tendency  to turn 
from  negative  to positive.2  In other  words,  along  with  the loss of credibility 
of the anti-inflationary  policy posture,  the given  values of Gramlich's  ex- 
planatory  variables  should  show  signs  of becoming  associated  with  steeper 
cost  trends. 
The rational expectations hypothesis-Views  based on the credibility 
hypothesis overlap with views usually associated with the hypothesis 
of rational  expectations.  I am  referring  to a set of views  as being  commonly 
associated  with "rational  expectations"  because  there  obviously  exists no 
joint  declaration  of authors  in such  matters  and  because  in some  ways  the 
views  i.n  question  are still evolving.  But to the extent  that it is possible  to 
speak  of jointly  held views of authors,  I do not believe that the proposi- 
2.  Gramlich did not correct for serial correlation, which, I  am told, was not 
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tions I regard  as characteristic  of analysis  based on the rational  expecta- 
tions  hypothesis  would  misrepresent  the views  of the authors  concerned.3 
(It would  be far-fetched  to base an appraisal  of the debate  on a qualifica- 
tion  to be described  in note 4 below.) 
The rational  expectations  hypothesis  overlaps  with that of the credi- 
bility  effect,  because  both stress  that  the public  is forming  its expectations 
on the basis of all available  information,  including  information  on the 
probable  future  actions  of policymakers.  However,  there  are two reasons 
why  the  overlap  is merely  partial. 
One  reason  is that  the views  commonly  associated  with  the rational  ex- 
pectations  hypothesis  suggest  that  experience  has in fact enabled  the pub- 
lic to detect a system by which the authorities  exert an influence on 
nominal  demand,  while  the credibility  hypothesis  suggests  that the public 
can detect such a system  only if the authorities  play effectively  into the 
hands of the market  participants  by behaving  consistently  in an under- 
standable  fashion. 
Consider,  for example,  a mode of behavior  of the policymakers  de- 
scribed  by the accommodation  of a so-called  underlying  inflation  rate in 
order  allegedly  to stabilize  that  rate, and consider  a policy that continues 
to accommodate  inflation  when  the underlying  rate steepens  (as it will in 
such circumstances),  yet becomes  temporarily  restrictive  at some rate of 
acceleration-not the same  rate  on successive  occasions.  The latter  mode 
of behavior  illustrates  game-strategy  situations  leading  to highly  volatile 
market  expectations  and  to large  risk  allowances.  This description  fits the 
post-1965 policy posture  of our authorities  regrettably  well. It cannot  be 
expected  to result in a state of the economy  usefully  described  as one in 
which a system governing  policy behavior  has been figured  out by the 
public. 
Dependence  of the suggested  conclusions  on the conditioning  of market 
3. For relatively recent contributions  see, for example, Thomas J. Sargent, "Ra- 
tional Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest, and the Natural Rate of Unemploy- 
ment," BPEA, 2:1973, pp. 429-80,  and "'Rational Expectations': A  Correction," 
BPEA,  3:1973,  pp.  799-800;  Thomas J.  Sargent and  Neil  Wallace,  "Rational 
Expectations  and the Theory of Economic Policy," and Robert J. Barro and Stanley 
Fischer, "Recent Developments in Monetwy Theory," Journal of  Monetary Eco- 
nomics, vol. 2 (April 1976), pp. 169-83 and 133-67, respectively;  Robert J. Barro, 
"Unanticipated  Money, Output  and the Price Level in the United States,"  Journal of 
Political Economzy,  vol.  86  (August 1978),  pp. 549-80.  References to the earlier 
contributions  by John Muth and Robert E. Lucas, Jr., are found in these articles. 
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expectations  to a determined  and well-understood  demand-management 
policy  is an essential  part  of the credibility  hypothesis  but not of the views 
commonly  associated  with the rational  expectations  hypothesis.  This is 
one reason why the overlap  is merely  partial,  but it does become a sub- 
stantial  overlap  if situations  are visualized  in which market  expectations 
have  in fact been successfully  conditioned  to a consistent  policy. Accord- 
ing to both hypotheses,  market decisions  will be reached  with a correct 
foresight  of such  policy behavior,  which  therefore  will not lead the public 
to misjudge  price  trends  and  act as if it had  money  illusion. 
The second  reason  why the overlap  between  the credibility  and the ra- 
tional  expectations  hypotheses  is less than  complete  applies  also  to circum- 
stances  in which  successful  conditioning  of market  expectations  to a credi- 
ble policy  line is taken  for granted.  With  qualifications  relating  to the role 
of institutional  rigidities,  the hypothesis  of rational  expectations  maintains 
that  the correctly  anticipated  "systematic"  component  of the  path  of nomi- 
nal demand  affects  merely  the price  level and  has no influence  on the real 
variables,  but that the random  deviations  about  that path, which can be 
foreseen  neither  by the authorities  nor  by the public,  do have an influence 
on the real magnitudes.  This  is supposed  to follow because  the public  sets 
its objectives  in real terms  and has figured  out the effect  of demand  pol- 
icies on the difference  between  "nominal"  and "real."  But the proposition 
involves  more than this, and it therefore  raises a number  of bothersome 
questions  that  are-at  best-partly semantic,  and  are  avoided  by the cred- 
ibility  hypothesis.4  For instance,  the specific  meaning  of institutional  rigid- 
ities raises  such a question.  The existence  of these rigidities  is known  to 
the public, and in the reasoning  of the rational  expectations  hypothesis 
4.  The possibility that some proponents of the rational expectations hypothesis 
might consider one or the other of the points to which I call attention noncontro- 
versial (or "semantic")  comes to mind mainly in view of conclusions formulated in 
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "An Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle," Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 83 (December 1975), pp. 1113-44. On assumptions  includ- 
ing limitations of  information and of  resource-mobility, (unexpected) shocks are 
represented  there as generating  "real"  effects encountered  during the business cycle, 
and it is suggested that the size of these disturbances  does depend on the nature of 
the planned nominal path. Yet it cannot be claimed that the points discussed in the 
text above have been clarified by the proponents of  the rational-expectations  hy- 
pothesis. Also, it is difficult to see what beyond the credibility hypothesis would be 
supposed  to remain intact if full allowance were made for these points. An appraisal 
of the present stage of the debate must imply that more or something different is 
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they are relegated  to the area of qualifications.  The list of institutional 
rigidities  that  qualify  the  proposition  would  have  to include  not only those 
items that come most readily  to mind for all real-world  economies  but 
even such items as  the inevitable  imperfections  of all tax indexation 
schemes  from  which  real tax effects  are  known  to develop  along  any  infla- 
tionary  or deflationary  nominal  path.  The list would  have  to include  even 
the  floor  placed  under  the real  rate  of interest  when  a correctly  anticipated 
nominal  path involves a declining  price  level and when the nominal  rate 
cannot decline below approximately  zero. These should perhaps  be re- 
garded  as at least implicitly  admitted qualifications  of  the proposition 
asserting  the "real  neutrality"  of the anticipated  nominal  path,  but quali- 
fications  of such strength  need to be faced directly  and in some detail. 
Another  bothersome  question  is raised  by the lack of sufficient  clarity 
in many cases of the distinction  between  the real effect of the expected 
path of nominal demand (denied by the rational  expectations  hypoth- 
esis), and the real effect of random  deviations  about that path (recog- 
nized  by the same  hypothesis).  This  distinction  is unclear  in circumstances 
in which  planned  nominal  paths and the size of the variance  about  them 
are  known  to be correlated.  How is that  distinction  to be interpreted  if the 
choice of an expected  nominal  path  is known  to involve  greater  variance 
about  it than the choice of another,  and the random  variance  about  the 
nominal  path has a long-run  influence  on the path of the real variables? 
Also, in such  circumstances  it is unclear  why  no real effect  should  be gen- 
erated  by the anticipated  propensity  of the demand-management  authori- 
ties to move in one direction  or the other  at the unforeseeable  date  when 
the variance  about  the nominal  path will start  causing  a noteworthy  dis- 
turbance.  Such  interventions  may  be wrongly  timed,  and  for this  reason  or 
for others  they  may cancel  or be counterproductive,  but that  is a different 
question  from  the existence  or nonexistence  of a real  effect. 
At the present  stage  of the debate  it seems  to me far  preferable  to steer 
clear  of these conceptual  difficulties,  and I will develop my argument  in 
terms  of the credibility  hypothesis.  This, too, involves rationality  of ex- 
pectations  but does not include several  of the propositions  that have be- 
come  associated  with  the hypothesis  identified  as that  of rational  expecta- 
tions. 
The remainder  of this  paper  is concerned  with two questions.  The first 
relates to the conditions  under  which a credible  policy of reducing  the 
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and the restoration  of a "normal"  output  path rather  than in contraction 
of  output combined with continued inflation. The other question is 
whether  the results  of the Gramlich  study  include  indications  that during 
part  of his sample  period  consistent  anti-inflationary  policies  generated  a 
credibility  effect  that  subsequently  became  extinct. 
Demand  Disinflation  and the ProbIem  of Stagflation 
The discussion  above does not imply  by logical necessity  that the au- 
thorities  can gradually  condition  the public  to the expectation  of a practi- 
cally stable  price level. The reason  is that the price  level is not in itself a 
policy  variable. 
Demand  management  can show determination  in its effort  to reduce 
the rate  of increase  of money  GNP from an inflationary  rate  to one com- 
patible with practically  noninflationary  conditions,  though even in this 
effort  it may  run  into difficulties  caused  by unpredictable  velocity  effects. 
Assuming  that  these  difficulties  can be overcome-say, by playing  safe in 
the direction  of restraint-the remaining  difficulty  is that the market  par- 
ticipants may become conditioned  to expect continued  price inflation 
coupled  with  a contraction  of output,  rather  than  a practically  stable  price 
level. This latter  difficulty  is hard  to distinguish  from that caused  by the 
belief  that  in time  the authorities  will  be forced  to give  up. 
At this point the problem  calls for taking  into consideration  some of 
the basic political and sociological  characteristics  of different  countries. 
It is necessary  first  to ask whether  a reduction  of the rate of increase  of 
money  GNP to a level compatible  with  practically  noninflationary  growth 
will, in time, actually  lead to such growth  rather  than to "chronic  stag- 
flation."  If the answer  is in the affirmative,  it is also important  to ask  what 
determines  the duration  and  the severity  of the transition  period. 
In this discussion  it is reasonable  to assume  that  a group  of market  par- 
ticipants  will fall in line with the objectives  of anti-inflationary  demand 
policies if it believes that most of the public will do so. This is the case 
because  otherwise  the group  in question  would  be acting  in the belief that 
its market  power had risen,  which should  have been reflected  in its be- 
havior, regardless  of whether a firm anti-inflationary  policy had been 
adopted.  The question  therefore  relates to the conditions  under  which a 
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other  market  participants  will adjust  their cost-setting  practices.  In that 
event,  they  individually  also  will be induced  to do so. 
The presumption  is strong  that in a country  in which  few believe that 
chaotic  conditions  will become  prevalent  for a long time,  individual  mar- 
ket participants  will expect  other  market  participants  to fall in line unless 
a major  part of the public adopts one of two views. The strategy  will 
not work if it is widely believed that the authorities  have an accept- 
able  alternative  to restoring  practical  price  stability-such as the stabiliza- 
tion of an appreciable  inflation  rate-and  if it is believed that at some 
stage  the policymakers  will shift to that course.  Nor will the public  tend 
to fall in line if it is believed  that  the authorities  can and  will rely  on other 
methods  for restoring  price stability,  thereby  reducing  their reliance  on 
demand  disinflation.  My own diagnosis  would  suggest  to me that most of 
the American  public is on the way to recognizing  that failure  to restore 
price  stability  would  have  a highly  detrimental  effect  because  a reasonably 
stable  inflationary  growth  path is a figment  of the imagination;  and that 
reliance  on policies besides demand  disinflation  for restoring  price sta- 
bility will soon be recognized  as unhelpful.  These other  methods  consist 
of either incomes policies administered  by votes-oriented  democratic 
governments  or comprehensive  controls under authorities  with greatly 
enlarged  powers;  and I believe it will not take long to convince  most of 
the American  population  that  these  methods  are  unpromising. 
Even those of us who believe  that, in the United  States,  public  opinion 
is changing  to recognize  that  the authorities  have  no alternative  to persist- 
ing in demand  disinflation  will have to anticipate  a transition  period  with 
at least somewhat  subnormal  resource  utilization  rates.  This is partly  be- 
cause  it will take time to establish  the credibility  of a new policy resolve, 
and partly  because  long-term  contracts  involve a carryover  of commit- 
ments  for a limited  period  during  which  even the new contracts  are  likely 
to be somewhat  influenced  by the carryover.5  I would find it astonishing 
if more than three  to five years-say,  the duration  of a business  cycle- 
were  needed  to establish  the credibility  of a truly  consistent  policy, and  if 
the macroeconomically  important  aftereffects  of long-run  commitments 
lasted longer.  This appraisal  is consistent  with the experience  of several 
other countries  that have recently  succeeded  in reducing  their inflation 
5. An analysis of this problem, with references to earlier contributions by Ed- 
mund Phelps and Arthur Okun, is found in John B. Taylor, "Staggered  Wage Setting 
in a Macro Model," American Econonmic  Review, vol. 69  (May 1979, Papers and 
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rates  from  high to negligible  levels, although  differences  exist in the na- 
ture  of the difficulties  that  need to be overcome  in different  countries.  In 
a related  but not identical context to be discussed  in the next section, 
Gramlich's  data for the United States  indicate  about a five-year  lag be- 
tween the end of consistent  demand  policies  aimed  at price  stability  in the 
mid-sixties  and  the emergence  of market  behavior  based  on allowance  for 
further  acceleration  rather  than for any likelihood  of a return  to a non- 
inflationary  price  trend. 
Implications  of the Gramlich  Study 
The credibility  hypothesis  leads to the presumption  that, in a model 
such  as Gramlich's,  one is apt  to find  a tendency  toward  negative residuals 
-expressing  an overestimate  of inflationary  increases-for the subperiod 
during  which  policies were aimed  at practical  price stability  (1954-65). 
Because of lags in the perception  of a change,  one would expect to find 
negative  residuals  also for a limited  period thereafter  and to observe a 
tendency  toward  positive residuals-expressing an underestimate  of the 
current  increases-for the subsequent  subperiod  of lax policies. This ex- 
pectation  is confirmed  for Gramlich's  wage-increase  equation,  to which 
one would primarily  apply this expectation;  that equation  at the same 
time avoids  some difficulties  inevitably  encountered  in his price-increase 
equation.6  The  data  suggest  that  after  1965 about  five  years  elapsed  before 
the public  lost all traces  of the pre-1965 conditioning  to policies  aimed  at 
price  stability. 
The residuals  shown in table 1 were obtained  by comparing  the ob- 
served  values  of the wage increase  to their  estimated  values  derived  with 
no correction  for serial  correlation.  These estimated  values are based  on 
the actual  values  of the lagged  explanatory  variables.  When  the 1954-70 
and 1971-78 periods are examined,  the difference  between  the ratio of 
positive  to negative  residuals  stands  out. For these  two periods  the differ- 
ence between  the mean (algebraic)  values  of the residuals  is significant  at 
6. The difficulties  with the price-increase  equation stem partly from the need to 
bridge the difference  between adjusted  average hourly earnings and labor compensa- 
tion in the private nonfarm sector and the need to bridge the difference  between the 
consumer price index and the private nonfarm deflator. Another major difficulty 
arises because the sum of the coefficients  in the price-increase  equation needed to be 
constrained  in order to be consistent with one or the other of the unavoidably arbi- 
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Table  1. Actual  Change  of Money Wage Rates Minus  Change  Predicted  by 
Gramlich's  Equation  1', 1954-78a 
Percentage pointsb 
Year  Residual 
1954  -0.6 
1955  -0.2 
1956  +1.6 
1957  +0.7 
1958  -0.5 
1959  -0.3 
1960  +0.  1 
1961  -0.  1 
1962  +0.3 
1963  -0.2 
1964  -0.5 
1965  -0.4 
1966  -0.2 
1967  -0.5 
1968  +0. 1 
1969  -0.5 
1970  -0.2 
1971  +0.3 
1972  0. O 
1973  0.00 
1974  +1.3 
1975  +0.6 
1976  -1.1 
1977  +0.3 
1978  +0.6 
Source: Author's estimate of equation 1' in the Gramlich study. 
a.  The wage rates are average hourly earnings in the private nonfarm sector, adjusted to exclude inter- 
industry shifts and overtime in manufacturing.  The author added an estimate of the 1978 residual on the 
basis of data now available. 
b. To be precise, differences  between natural logs multiplied by one hundred. 
c. Rounded from a positive number. 
a level somewhat  better  than 10 percent  in a one-tail  test. Other  indica- 
tions  point  in the same  direction.7 
7.  The 1971-78 period includes five years for which the preceding year's price 
increase-an  important  determinant  of the current  year's  wage increase in the model 
-shows  a steepening  of inflation.  For four of these five years the current  year's wage 
residual was positive, suggesting  that even more than the already steepened price in- 
crease entered the wage-determining  process. Throughout  that period no counterpart 
occurs in any negative wage residuals for years that were preceded by a reduced 
rate of price increase.  Also, this observation  is in sharp contrast with the behavior of 
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I do not attribute  much  importance  to this method  of testing  the credi- 
bility hypothesis  because I would not be much influenced  by a conven- 
tional significance  test if it had less favorable  results  for the hypothesis. 
By its choice of the null hypothesis,  the conventional  test gives a huge 
benefit  of the doubt  to the highly unconvincing  assumption  that in recent 
years  the public  has not changed  the way in which,  given  the other  speci- 
fied variables  of a standard  model (in Gramlich's  case, given only the 
current  slack  in the economy), current  wage increases  develop  from  past 
price and wage increases.  In Gramlich's  wage-increase  equation  even a 
substantial  benefit  of the doubt given to this implausible  assumption  is 
overcome  by the behavior  of the residuals.  Yet regardless  of this,  it would 
be astonishing  if the wage-moderating  effect  associated  with a given slack 
were identical  under two circumstances:  (1)  when the authorities  are 
firmly  expected  to give  high  priority  to the demand-policy  restraint  needed 
to fight any past steepening  of price increases  and (2)  when unemploy- 
ment-rate  targets are expected  to become dominant  soon again,  even at 
high  rates  of inflation. 
In conclusion,  it should be stressed  that the widely used regression 
technique  is not particularly  dependable,  and one should not look for 
final answers  in any of the available  models. I am sure Gramlich  and I 
would  agree  on this  and  so would (or should  ?) practically  all economists. 
So far as the model  discussed  above  is concerned,  it does provide  indica- 
tions of differences  between the 1954-70  and the 1971-78 periods in 
the way  in which  price  expectations  and  therefore  actual  wage  trends  were 
related  to past price and wage experience.  Consideling  that price history 
would suggest  that the break  should  have come soon after  the middle  of 
the 1960s, these indications  point to a lag of a few years  before the full 
realization  of a major  change  in the conduct  of demand  policy. 
But leaving  specific  models  aside, it is possible  to tell the story  differ- 
ently than  I have, and to place almost  the entire  emphasis  on the weight 
of past heritage  on the evolution  of current  events.  This is what  standard 
models are in fact doing. Yet what in Bayesian  theory are called one's 
priors  cannot  be disregarded  in these  matters,  and  it is necessary  to decide 
whether  to give the benefit  of the doubt  to the assumption  that  the process 
of determining  wages and prices  is mostly  backward-looking  or, alterna- 
tively,  to the assumption  that the process  appears to be so only if policy- 
makers  are  expected  to continue  accommodating  past  first  or higher  price 
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ways  of looking  at the  problem  much  more  convincing,  and thus  I believe 
that  coefficients  such as that estimated  by Gramlich  would  change  signifi- 
cantly under a firm  policy. But while I suggest  strong  indications  of a 
credibility  effect  in the data, I do not believe that the matter  will be de- 
cided  at the  level of regression  analysis. 
The Public's  Acceptance  of Demand  Disinflation 
Gramlich  and  others  have  rightly  stressed  that,  in a democracy,  policies 
must  be acceptable  to the public.  As I said above,  I base my views about 
the future  of demand  disinflation  on the belief that the time is approach- 
ing when  the public  will be convinced  that  the temporary  difficulties  asso- 
ciated  with consistent  disinflation  are inevitable.  I believe we are not far 
from  there,  even if we may  not yet have arrived  quite  at that  point. 
As for Gramlich's  interesting  and original analysis of variables  de- 
termining  whether  the public, when polled, regards  inflation as more 
troublesome  than unemployment  or vice versa, I doubt that the results 
bear closely on  the problems  discussed  here. If, in definable  circum- 
stances,  a person  says  that  at present  he considers  unemployment  the more 
troublesome  problem,  I do not interpret  his answer  as logically  implying 
that  he is agreeable  to efforts  by which  unemployment  is temporarily  re- 
duced at the expense  of more inflation.  He might  be well aware  that, if 
the authorities  undertake  such efforts,  then  he will soon say that inflation 
has now become  the more troublesome  problem.  To use an analogy,  if a 
person running  a high temperature  is taking antibiotics  that make him 
feel uncomfortable,  then, as the fever is reduced,  he will at some point 
truthfully  say that  the discomfort  caused  by the medicine  exceeds  the dis- 
comfort  caused by the fever. Yet while the problems  involved in such 
points  of indifference  are worth  exploring,  it fortunately  does not follow 
that  such  a person  will refuse  to take  antibiotics. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Edmund  S. Phelps: Edward Gramlich's  skillful and provocative  paper 
presents  an econometric  assessment  of the benefits and costs entailed  by 
a monetary  policy of "accommodating"  supply  shocks.  For Gramlich  and 
others,  a policy of accommodation  means  adjusting  the money  supply  in 
response  to the unanticipated  supply shock in such a way that the un- 
employment  rate is equated (perhaps  with some unavoidable  lag) to its 
previous  value  or perhaps  its previous  target  value.  In my paper  on supply 
shocks,  a policy of accommodation  means  adjusting  the money  supply  in 
such a way that  the unemployment  rate  is equated  (in the expected  value 
sense) to its equilibrium  value; by that I mean that the unemployment 
rate is kept to a level at which wage setters  are glad they set the money- 
wage rates they did (rather  than lower rates, as would  be the case if the 
monetary  policy were to allow employment  to slump  in response  to the 
supply shock).  Thus the central bank reinforces  the pattern of wage 
expectations,  and the resulting  path of realized  wages, that it seeks to 
instill. 
The particular  accommodative  monetary  policy  envisioned  in my  paper 
is one that encourages  the expectation  on the part  of wage  setters  that the 
average  money wage will "track"  from period to period some predesig- 
nated trend path-either  a flat path or a regularly  rising  path. Conse- 
quently  that policy never creates  the expectation  of a deficiency  of the 
derived  aggregate  demand  for labor at the "programmed"  money-wage 
level-as  would be the case if the money supply were expected  to be 
unbending  in response  to a drop  in the marginal  money-value  productivity 
of labor caused  by a supply  shock;  if monetary  policy did that, it would 
be inviting  a sag of money-wage  rates  below the programmed  time path. 
But the accommodative  policy would allow employment  and output  to 
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suffer  if and when money-wage  rates somehow  strayed  above their pro- 
grammed  path. In a paper I wrote with John Taylor, consideration  is 
given to a variant  of this plan: when the average  of money-wage  rates 
deviates  from the old programmed  path, the economy is appropriately 
penalized  with deficient  (or excessive) employment,  so that  wage setters 
will not think  that  they  can with  impunity  entertain  arbitrary  expectations 
of what  the average  money  wage  is going  to do; but today's  deviant  wage 
constitutes  the new base from  which the newly  programmed  growth  path 
of planned  money  wages  now originates. 
Is this program  not as fine a vision as any of the good macroeconomic 
life?  Yes, there  is Milton  Friedman's  caveat  to reckon  with: by striving  to 
realize  this program  too exactly,  we might  on average  make  things  worse, 
not better. So some compromises  might  have to be made on this score. 
But other than that, what is wrong  with it? Yes, there is the additional 
point that the price level will follow a random  walk process (assuming 
that supply shocks are independently  distributed).  And even the trend 
rate of inflation  will shift with sea changes  in the rate of productivity 
growth.  But the alternative  is that  money  wages  follow a random  walk and 
even suffer  occasional shifts in their trend rate of growth.  Why is the 
latter  policy  option  superior  to the former? 
No less an economist  than John  Maynard  Keynes,  as I finally  remem- 
bered, had come down on the side of a wage standard  as the best guide 
for monetary  policy. And even The Wall Street  Journal  extolled West 
Germany  in a recent editorial  for its pursuit  of a wage standard  (rather 
than  an employment  standard).  It makes  some  sense  to try  to stabilize  the 
price that is determined  in the most imperfect  market,  letting  prices de- 
termined  in perfect  markets  be free.  Presumably  the labor  market  is typi- 
cally less perfect  than the product  markets,  so from  this  point  of view it is 
the average  money  wage  that  is the  best  candidate  for stabilization  (around 
a predesignated  trend  path). 
Gramlich's  paper  expresses  a number  of reservations  on his part  about 
the desirability  of the Keynes-Phelps  vision. A highly accommodative 
policy scores worse than a policy of price-level  stabilization  (and espe- 
cially worse  than a policy of nominal-income  stabilization)  if the welfare 
cost imputed  to variability  of inflation  is sufficiently  large  compared  with 
the  welfare  cost of variability  in employment-the more  so the smaller  the 
social  rate  of discount,  and  the more  so the more  expansionary  the current 
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erences.  But doesn't  Gramlich  load the dice by focusing  on the variability 
of the actual  rate  of inflation  instead  of the variability  of the expected  rate 
of inflation,  which  is presumably  far  more  stable?  If it is movements  of the 
actual  price level that people do not like, anticipated  or unanticipated, 
why should a worker  hate to see a doubling  of the price level over ten 
years  more than a halving  of his money  wage over that  same  time?  If the 
representative  worker's  dislike of variability  in the price level is just his 
way of expressing  dislike of variability  in his real  wage,  then  giving  him a 
harshly  nonaccommodating  monetary  policy could  hardly  make  him hap- 
pier because it could do little to stabilize his real wage and much to 
destabilize  his real earnings. 
The concept of accommodation  in Gramlich's  test is different  from 
constancy  of the money-wage  path because of his introduction  of the 
positive  a3  term  in his equation  1-that  is, the feedback  of past  price  infla- 
tion on the current  rate of wage  inflation  given  the past  rate  of wage  infla- 
tion. If I am not mistaken,  a highly  accommodative  policy in Gramlich's 
conception  tends to maintain  the rate of unemployment;  so a one-shot 
increase  of the price  level (through  the feedback  onto wages  and  the lat- 
ter's  effect  back  on the price  level) leads to an indefinite  lift of the rate  of 
inflation  and, correspondingly,  the rate of increase  of the money wage. 
But that is hyper-accommodation  compared  to the more modest  propos- 
als of Keynes and me. Does Gramlich's  policy of cold turkey  beat the 
warm  beer  of constant  money  wages (or regularly  rising  money  wages) as 
advocated  here-when  there  is the price-wage  feedback?  The latter  con- 
testant  would  be less easy to beat than  Gramlich's  accommodative  straw 
man. Before leaving this topic I ought to say that the presence  of past 
inflation  in an expectational  theory  of the Phillips  curve is debatable  at 
best;  but one might  think  of this  factor  as attributable  to escalator  clauses 
in wage contracts  of two or more years.  I concede  that I left that factor 
out of consideration  in the formal  part  of my analysis  of supply-shock  ac- 
commodation;  but see, however,  the extensive  informal  discussion  of the 
matter  at the close of my  paper. 
One last point: Gramlich's  analysis  of the staggered-contract  model 
with rational  expectations,  with which  he concludes  his paper,  leads him 
to the proposition  that the effects  of a supply  shock on employment  are 
entirely  extinguished  in finite  time-after  the contemporaneously  extant 
contracts  have all expired-even  when monetary  policy is completely 
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more  to downgrade  accommodation-it is only needed temporarily  any- 
way.  But  this  property  does  not emerge  from  the world  of unindexed  over- 
lapping  contracts  studied,  for example,  by John  Taylor  and  me. There  the 
traces  of a shock  last forever  unless  erased  by an activist  monetary  policy 
or else covered  over  by some  new shock. 
Robert  J. Gordon: The "positive  economics"  of supply  shocks  seems  now 
a well-established  and  relatively  uncontroversial  part  of macroeconomics. 
For any given  growth  rate  in nominal  GNP, any event  that shifts  upward 
the short-run  inflation-unemployment  trade-off  curve  will alter the divi- 
sion of the change  in nominal  GNP between  inflation  and growth  of real 
output.  To maintain  the  previous  inflation  rate,  nominal  GNP growth  must 
be slowed.  To maintain  the previous  unemployment  rate,  an accommoda- 
tive acceleration  in nominal  GNP growth  must  be allowed.  In early 1974, 
Phelps  and I predicted  that the OPEC  oil shock  would cause a recession 
if nominal  GNP growth  followed the widely forecast  path, and I added 
that the price rebound  following  the end of controls  would aggravate  the 
downward  pressure  on real  output. 
The main substantive  question  remaining  in the positive  economics  of 
supply  shocks  is the same as that originally  identified  in that early  litera- 
ture: how will the expectations  of future  inflation  by firms  and workers 
respond, a question that naturally  depends on whether the shock is 
thought  to be transitory  or permanent.  In the face of a permanent  shock, 
the "natural"  level of output  is permanently  reduced,  and employment 
will also be reduced  during  a potentially  lengthy  adjustment  interval,  de- 
pending  on the  flexibility  of the  real  wage. 
In contrast  to this  straightforward  analysis,  the "normative  economics" 
of supply  shocks-what policymakers  should  do-is  a difficult  and  highly 
controversial  area, and it is here that Gramlich's  paper makes its main 
contribution.  Ironically  this topic, the welfare  economics  of inflation  and 
unemployment,  has nothing  intrinsic to do with supply  shocks,  and most 
of its literature  antedates  the shock episode of  1974. But a full dis- 
cussion of this policy trade-off  is more relevant  than ever in 1979. Not 
only have  we had  three  visible  and  widely  discussed  adverse  supply  shocks 
-in  the form of increased  relative  prices  of food and oil and of govern- 
ment price-raising  policies (minimum  wage, payroll  tax, and others)- 
but also the slowdown  in aggregate  productivity  growth  creates  yet an- Edward  Gramlich  and William  Fellner  183 
other shock if the ability of firms  to pay higher  real wages decelerates 
relative  to worker  aspirations  for higher  real  wages. 
One weakness  of Gramlich's  paper  is that  it contains  too much.  Every 
alternative  is considered,  presenting  an enormous  number  of permutations 
of policy  responses.  Without  whittling  down  his menu  of possibilities,  the 
reader  really is left in the dark about when policy should deviate  from 
the basic recipe of complete accommodation.  The answers  depend on 
( 1  ) whether  the long-run  trade-off  is vertical,  (2) whether  wages  depend 
partly on past prices or just on past wages, (3)  whether  the short-run 
Phillips  curve  is steep or flat, (4) whether  the parameters  are affected  by 
government  policy, (5) whether  the public fears inflation  or unemploy- 
ment more, (6)  whether  the future  is discounted  at a high or low rate, 
and (7) whether  the supply  shocks  are  serially  correlated. 
Let me begin by questioning  Gramlich's  eclecticism  on the long-run 
trade-off.  I conjecture  that his nonvertical  long-run  curve results  almost 
entirely  from  his use of the consumer  price  index (CPI) on the right-hand 
side of the wage  equation.  In my paper  in BPEA, 2:1972, which  provided 
a battery  of sensitivity  tests on this and other issues, it was clear that 
George  Perry's  choice  of the CPI always  led to a lower sum  of coefficients 
on lagged  prices  in the  wage  equation  than  the alternative  of using  the  per- 
sonal consumption  or private  nonf  arm deflator.  In statistical  terms,  the 
CPI contains  measurement  error  due to its treatment  of mortgage  interest 
rates and food prices, and thus its coefficient  tends to be biased toward 
zero. Acceptance of  a vertical long-run trade-off curve helps reduce 
Gramlich's  overly large menu of possibilities  not only directly,  but in- 
directly  by throwing  out two of his seven estimates  of the parameter,  b, 
those  labeled  "revealed  preference." 
The long-run  trade-off  problem  can be expressed  another  way. I have 
recently  compared  the results  obtained  from the estimation  of separate 
wage and price equations  and of a single reduced-form  price equation. 
The long-run  trade-off  coefficients  in the two-equation  approach  seem 
quite  sensitive  to the particular  choice  of the wage  and  price  data,  whereas 
the single-equation  approach  seems quite robust  in its finding  that the 
long-run  trade-off  is vertical. 
An example  of the pitfalls of running  separate  wage and price equa- 
tions is illustrated  by Gramlich's  handling  of the results  of measurement 
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falls short of 1.0 but in the price equation  exceeds 1.0. His asymmetric 
remedy  is to constrain  the latter  equation  but not the former.  Neither  or 
both should  have  been constrained,  and  better  yet, all results  should  have 
been cross-checked  by fitting the single reduced-form  price equation 
directly. 
The size of the price  feedback  on wages  is a crucial  item on the menu 
of possibilities,  because it governs  the response  of real wages to supply 
shocks. One aspect  is the point made by Robert Lucas and by William 
Fellner  in his report  in this issue: parameters  shift in response  to policy. 
Fast inflation  has substantially  increased  the share  of wage contracts  that 
are formally  indexed, and thus the lagged price coefficient  in the wage 
equation  should  be expected  to be higher  in the 1970s than it was in the 
1950s and early 1960s. Part of the rapid  increase  of wages in 1974 re- 
sulted  from the escalator  response  to oil, food, and "end-of-controls"  in- 
flation. 
A second  problem  is Gramlich's  refusal  to constrain  his "post-controls 
rebound"  dummy  variables  to have a coefficient  exactly  equal  in absolute 
value (but opposite  in sign) to his initial  controls  dummies.  Because  the 
procedure  allows a free dummy  variable  coefficient  in 1974-75, while 
preventing  the price-wage  feedback  coefficient  from varying  in response 
to the increased  importance  of indexing,  Gramlich's  results  are likely to 
understate  the size of the price-wage  feedback  coefficient. 
The heart  of the paper  is the normative  analysis:  what is the welfare 
loss caused  by differing  degrees  of accommodation?  Here the wide range 
of estimates  of b is disconcerting.  The largest  estimate,  b =  4.0, comes 
from the constrained  Gallup poll. While I am convinced  that the con- 
straint  is sensible  and that the results  in table 1 should  be ignored,  I am 
nevertheless  skeptical  of the use of poll data  for this purpose,  for several 
reasons. 
First,  answers  to the inflation  question  do not tell us anything  about  the 
"pure"  effect  of inflation.  People see inflation  eroding  their real income; 
however,  in their answers  they do not consider  the numerous  offsetting 
effects  of inflation  that are  known  to economists  in classrooms  but not to 
shoppers  in grocery  stores.  Inflation  tends  to raise  prices  now and wages 
later,  creating  a real wage  effect  that  is transitory.  Inflation  cuts the value 
of nominal assets, but families do not realize that corporations  and 
governments  gain and are able to use their gains to reward  consumers, 
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is extremely  misleading).  The final  deadweight  loss from  inflation  is much 
smaller  than the gross amounts shuffled  around among groups in the 
economy,  and many of its redistributive  effects could be eliminated  by 
the types of policies Gramlich  does not consider-for  example,  the de- 
regulation  of financial  institutions  and  the issuance  of an indexed  govern- 
ment  bond. 
Second, the man in the street similarly  exaggerates  the effect of un- 
employment;  in a period of rising unemployment,  he begins to worry 
about  losing  his job, even  though  his income  may  remain  unaffected.  This 
"extrapolative  fear  effect"  should  be ignored  by omniscient  policymakers, 
who for any given  supply  shock  should  be able to predict  that  nonaccom- 
modative  policies will increase  unemployment  by only a finite amount. 
Third, Gramlich's  interpretation  of the Modigliani-Papademos  study 
appears  to accept  an obsolete  estimate  of the Okun's  law coefficient  (3.0), 
and  to ignore  the distinction  between  temporary  and  permanent  increases 
in unemployment.  The so-called  Okun's  law puzzle  of 1978 is resolved  in 
an unpublished  paper  by James  Glassman,  who shows that the dramatic 
decline in unemployment  in the 1975-78 period can be explained  by a 
deceleration  in potential GNP growth  corresponding  to slower secular 
growth  of productivity  and by the finding  that the Okun's  law coefficient 
is actually  2.0, not 3.0. 
The long-run  effect  that  brings  down  the Okun's  law coefficient  occurs 
as firms  begin to adjust  to lower employment  by eliminating  idle plant 
and idle overhead  workers,  and the distortion  in hours per worker.  In 
1973, I argued  (BPEA, 1:1973) that, for the long run, the Okun's  law 
coefficient  is actually  less than 1.0, as optimum  plant sizes, overhead 
workers,  and  hours  are  adjusted  to the  new situation. 
Fourth, a related factor ignored by Gramlich  is that the long-run 
growth  rate  of potential  real  GNP should  enter  the social  welfare  function. 
The cutback  in the investment-GNP  ratio during  the typical recession 
permanently  endows  society with a lower capital stock, while higher  in- 
flation  combined  with a nonindexed  tax system  creates  offsetting  (Feld- 
stein-Summers)  disincentive  effects.  I believe  that  the long-run  effects  on 
the capital  stock of a given increase  in unemployment  dominate  those of 
an equal  percentage-point  increase  in inflation,  but I cannot  convert  this 
conjecture  into a "proof"  at this  time. 
My conclusion  regarding  the value  of b is that  the poll results  are  more 
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and  that  an appeal  to a priori  economic  reasoning  would  probably  yield a 
b estimate  closer to 4.0 than 1.0, supporting  a relatively  accommodative 
policy stance. 
Finally,  let me report  some  results  that  cast doubt  on the Fellner  credi- 
bility hypothesis.  In equations explaining  price change, a contest was 
held between  lagged inertia  terms and mneasures  of expected  policy a la 
Barro.  The results  strongly  suggest  that the response  of prices  to policy 
expectations  in the 1954-78  period was essentially  zero, and that the 
inertia  effect  dominates.  This econometric  result  corresponds  to reality, 
as I see it. Does Fellner really think that a strong  speech by President 
Carter  or Chairman  Miller of the Federal Reserve would have led the 
airline  machinists  to ratify  rather  than reject  an already  inflationary  set- 
tlement?  The attitude  of the public  toward  government  statements  is skep- 
tical; agents  know that a new administration  in 1981 might  reverse  any 
present deflationary  resolve. The public's attitude  is rightly "we'll pay 
attention  to what you achieve,  not to what you say."  The difficulties  of 
the United States in this regard  are contrasted  by Fellner to the faster 
response  of inflation  to anticipated  policy in some other countries,  but 
here I think he overlooks the pernicious  role of our decentralized  and 
staggered  wage-bargaining  system  and  the difficulty  of changing  that  insti- 
tution. 
General  Discussion 
Lawrence  Krause  urged  that Gramlich's  analysis  be extended  beyond 
the closed-economy  perspective  of the paper.  Once international  aspects 
are  recognized,  it becomes  clear  that  a supply  shock  might  have  important 
effects  on the terms  of trade  and on external  asset and debt  positions  and 
that the U.S. policy response  might have significant  international  feed- 
backs. In particular,  Krause  felt that the appropriate  policy response  to 
a supply  shock  that improved  the terms  of trade  and  raised  real  incomes, 
like a Russian  crop failure, might  be very different  from the response  to 
a shock that lowered real incomes, like the formation  of OPEC. But 
Gramlich  doubted  that the nature  of the change  in relative  prices  would 
alter the appropriateness  of accommodation  or nonaccommodation  by 
macroeconomic  policy. 
William  Poole shared  an aspect  of Krause's  concern  about  equating  all 
supply  shocks.  He called attention  to positive shocks,  like the U.K. dis- Edward  Gramlich  and William  Fellner  187 
covery  of oil in the North  Sea. In his judgment,  the appropriate  response 
to a major  strike  that  produced  disruptive  effects  in other  industries  might 
well differ  from  a response  to an agricultural  shortfall.  Nor was it obvious 
to him  that  the proper  policy  response  should  be the same  to government- 
induced  shocks as to truly exogenous  ones. For example,  both a with- 
drawal  of land from  production  mandated  by the government  and a crop 
failure due to the weather  would raise consumer  prices;  but these two 
events  do not necessarily  point  to identical  policy  adjustments. 
Much of the discussion  was related  to Gramlich's  assessment  of the 
relative costs of inflation  and unemployment.  James Duesenberry  and 
Lawrence  Summers  argued  that  the respondents  to Gallup  surveys  might 
fail to take account  of subtle  social costs of inflation.  Duesenberry  men- 
tioned  the costs  of the social  frictions  that  resulted  from  the  need  to change 
certain  politically  determined  prices  and tax schedules,  and he noted the 
effects  of rapid  and variable  inflation  on economic  stability  resulting  from 
the encouragement  of speculative  activity  and the need for international 
adjustment.  Summers  pointed  to the distortions  of capital  accumulation 
resulting  from the effects  of inflation  that  operate  through  the tax system. 
Duesenberry  emphasized  equally  that the social costs of unemployment, 
which  operate  by harming  job and  promotion  opportunities  for minorities, 
might not be adequately  reflected  in the responses  obtained  by Gallup. 
Unemployment  can be quite costly, even if most people are not affected 
by it. Arthur  Okun  remarked  that,  in responding  to opinion  surveys,  peo- 
ple put much more  weight  on unemployment  when asked  whether  it was 
a serious problem for the country than when asked whether  it was a 
serious  problem  for them  personally. 
William  Brainard  argued  that Gramlich's  procedure  involves double 
counting.  Individuals  presumably  incorporate  in their responses some 
expectations  about  the likely  duration  of unemployment  and  inflation  and 
have already  done the summing.  Experience  tells them that inflation  is 
longer  lasting  than  unemployment;  therefore  they respond  more strongly 
to bad news of inflation.  Hence, using  their  responses  to weight  the vari- 
ables  each  period  and  then  summing  over  periods  is likely  to overstate  the 
relative  costs  of inflation. 
Brainard  also questioned  Gramlich's  choice of the interest  rate  to dis- 
count  the future  costs of inflation  and  unemployment.  The after-tax  inter- 
est rate  of lenders  did not seem  particularly  relevant  for people  affected  by 
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Recognizing  the limitations  and problems  that others  had highlighted, 
Peter Kenen nevertheless supported Gramlich's "consumer sover- 
eignty"  approach  to the appraisal  of social costs. He suggested  that more 
attention  should be paid to the way the responses  were influenced  by 
movements  of real  wages  and  real  wealth  during  inflationary  periods. 
William  Nordhaus  doubted  that  the social  cost function  could  be linear 
in inflation  and  unemployment,  even though  Gramlich  could  not establish 
nonlinearity  in his regression  using Gallup data. Intuition  suggests  that 
people are more averse to inflation  at high rates of inflation  and more 
averse  to unemployment  at high  rates  of unemployment.  Such  nonlinearity 
would push the optimal  policy response  toward  compromise  and away 
from full accommodation.  Also, Nordhaus  pointed to the literature  on 
voting  behavior  as another  source  of information  on public  attitudes  to- 
ward  inflation  and  unemployment. 
Franco  Modigliani  emphasized  that Gramlich's  results  depended  heav- 
ily on the assumed  nonlinearity  of the Phillips  curve.  That is a standard 
assumption  in the literature,  but he had not been able to verify it em- 
pirically,  nor had other  investigators.  James  Tobin  noted  that  the case  for 
accommodation  rested on shocks that created  vertical  displacements  of 
the Phillips curve; any shock that produced  a horizontal displacement 
(as a strike  might) would  not call  for accommodation. 
A number  of participants  criticized  the "robbery"  analogy  Gramlich 
had cited from Modigliani  and Lucas Papademos.  Tobin noted that the 
anticipated  part  of inflation  would  not generate  such a transfer  of wealth. 
Moreover,  he pointed out that unemployment  as well as inflation  had 
distributional  costs. The distributive  costs of inflation should not be 
balanced  against  only  the aggregative  costs  of unemployment. 
Robert  Gordon's  comments  on Gramlich's  paper  evoked  some discus- 
sion.  Kenen  reminded  Gordon  that  the appropriateness  of any  price  index 
in a wage equation  should  not be judged  by whether  it yielded  a vertical 
Phillips  curve,  but rather  by goodness  of fit and ability  to predict  outside 
the sample. Martin Baily felt that the growing scope of cost-of-living 
escalators,  which  Gordon  had emphasized,  argued  for the consumer  price 
index as the most promising  candidate.  Michael  Wachter  suggested  that 
the growing  reliance  on cost-of-living  allowances  would shorten  the lags 
in responses  to fiscal and monetary  policy, as compared  with the lags 
found  in equations  fitted  to historical  data. 
Other  participants  commented  on William  Fellner's  credibility  thesis. Edward  Gramlich  and William  Fellner  189 
Walter  Salant  felt that Fellner  might  well be too optimistic  in expecting 
people  to unwind  their  inflationary  expectations  in three  to five  years.  He 
noted that an entire generation  had come of age with no experience  of 
price stability.  Considering  how long it took a preceding  generation- 
whose  formative  years  had  been spent  in the depression  of the thirties-to 
adjust  to an environment  of prosperity,  Salant  doubted  that widespread 
expectations  of inflation  could be displaced  in as few as five years, let 
alone  in three.  Duesenberry  feared  that a credible  anti-inflationary  policy 
could be a double-edged  sword.  Although  some people might set lower 
prices  assuming  that  prices  and  wages  set  by others  were  going  to be lower, 
others  might  lower their  demands  for output  in the expectation  of a deep 
recession.  Thus while he agreed  that the parameters  would  be influenced 
by a credible  policy, he suggested  that the result  might  be a more severe 
recession  as  well as less inflation. 
Finally, Gramlich  sought to qualify Fellner's antibiotic analogy. A 
person  will continue  taking  antibiotics  only if he trusts  the doctor's  judg- 
ment.  If he does not-say,  because  he doubts  that  the doctor  understands 
the inflationary  disease-he  may well refuse to take the painful unem- 
ployment  medicine,  and fire all doctors  who prescribe  it. That  is why the 
Gallup  poll results  can  become  relevant. 